3.3.1.9. Certificate Management and Encryption in Transit (ACM, AWS Private CA, TLS 1.3, Mutual TLS)
3.3.1.9. Certificate Management and Encryption in Transit (ACM, AWS Private CA, TLS 1.3, Mutual TLS)
💡 First Principle: Encryption in transit fails most often through certificate operations, not cryptography: an expired certificate, a hop left in clear text, or a client nobody authenticated. Automate the certificate lifecycle and decide deliberately where TLS ends.
AWS Certificate Manager (ACM):
- Public certificates are free when deployed to integrated services (
"ELB","CloudFront","API Gateway"). Use DNS validation: ACM renews automatically as long as the validation CNAME stays in place, while email-validated certificates wait for someone to approve the renewal. Since February 2026, new public certificates are valid for at most 198 days (CA/Browser Forum rules), which makes manual renewal even less viable. - ACM is Regional: request a certificate in each Region where a load balancer uses it, and in us-east-1 for CloudFront. Imported third-party certificates are not renewed by ACM.
- Integrated-service private keys are not exportable; exportable public certificates (paid) exist for EC2 or on-premises servers that must terminate TLS themselves.
AWS Private CA: a managed private PKI for internal names, mutual TLS clients, service-to-service TLS, and IAM Roles Anywhere trust anchors. General-purpose mode issues certificates of any validity; short-lived certificate mode (seven days or less) costs much less per CA and suits automated workloads where expiry replaces revocation (ACM cannot issue from a short-lived CA). ACM private certificates issued from your CA renew automatically on integrated services. Share a CA across accounts with "AWS RAM".
TLS policies and where TLS ends:
- Choose an
"ALB"/"NLB"security policy that offers TLS 1.3 and accepts TLS 1.2 as the floor; TLS 1.0/1.1 policies fail most compliance rules. - For end-to-end encryption, re-encrypt to the targets (HTTPS target group, certificate on the targets) or use an
"NLB"TCP listener to pass TLS through untouched when the back end must terminate it itself.
Mutual TLS (client certificates):
| Option | What it does | Use when |
|---|---|---|
| ALB mTLS verify mode | ALB validates the client chain against a trust store (CA bundle in S3, optional CRLs) and passes identity in X-Amzn-Mtls-Clientcert-* headers | You want the load balancer to reject untrusted or revoked clients with no code in the targets |
| ALB mTLS passthrough mode | ALB forwards the whole client chain in a header without checking it | Targets already implement certificate validation or need custom logic |
| API Gateway custom domain mTLS | Truststore in S3, API Gateway authenticates the client | APIs fronted by API Gateway |
⚠️ Exam Trap: An HTTPS listener alone does not mean "encrypted end to end": the ALB-to-target hop is clear text unless the target group uses HTTPS. "VPC Flow Logs" record traffic metadata and prove nothing about encryption.