3.3.1.10. Post-Quantum Cryptography Strategy (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, Hybrid TLS)
3.3.1.10. Post-Quantum Cryptography Strategy (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, Hybrid TLS)
💡 First Principle: A large quantum computer would break today's public-key algorithms (RSA, elliptic curves), not well-sized symmetric ones. Anything an adversary can record today and keep, mainly TLS sessions protected by classical key exchange, is already at risk if it must stay secret for decades.
What is and is not at risk:
- Key exchange (confidentiality): ECDH and RSA key transport can be broken retroactively. This is the "harvest now, decrypt later" threat, so it comes first for data with a long confidentiality life.
- Signatures (authenticity): forging needs the quantum computer at the time of the attack, so the urgency is lower, except for long-lived trust such as firmware, code signing and root CAs that must still verify in 15 years.
- Data at rest under AWS KMS symmetric keys uses AES-256-GCM, which stays strong (a quantum attack reduces it to roughly 128-bit security). Re-encrypting stored data does nothing for quantum risk.
NIST standards (August 2024): ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key establishment and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) for digital signatures.
What AWS provides:
| Need | AWS capability |
|---|---|
| Protect calls to AWS APIs in transit | Hybrid post-quantum TLS (ECDH combined with ML-KEM) on AWS KMS, ACM and Secrets Manager endpoints (KMS: all Regions and endpoints, including FIPS). Clients opt in through SDK/HTTP-client settings; verify in the CloudTrail tlsDetails.keyExchange field (for example X25519MLKEM768) and alarm on calls without it |
| Protect your clients' connections to your applications | ALB/NLB post-quantum TLS security policies (since November 2025): hybrid ML-KEM key exchange for clients that offer it, classical fallback for older clients |
| Post-quantum signatures with keys in HSMs you don't operate | KMS ML-DSA keys (ML_DSA_44/65/87, key usage SIGN_VERIFY, since June 2025): Sign handles messages up to 4 KB (RAW); larger content uses the EXTERNAL_MU message type |
| Post-quantum key establishment in your own protocol | KMS ML-KEM keys (ML_KEM_512/768/1024, key usage ENCAPSULATE_DECAPSULATE, added October 2026): the sender encapsulates a 32-byte shared secret with the recipient's public key; the recipient calls Decapsulate, and the private key never leaves KMS. Derive data keys from the secret. ML-KEM keys are not available in the China Regions |
| Post-quantum private PKI | AWS Private CA ML-DSA CAs and certificates (since November 2025), for example code-signing or internal mTLS hierarchies |
A migration plan that holds up:
- Inventory where RSA and ECC are used (TLS endpoints, VPNs, signing, key wrapping) and rank each by how long its data must stay confidential or its signatures must verify.
- Turn on hybrid PQ TLS first for long-lived confidential data in transit: SDK settings for AWS API calls, PQ policies on load balancers.
- Test the network path: larger handshake messages can be dropped by older proxies or deep-packet-inspection firewalls.
- Build crypto agility: don't hard-code algorithms or key specs, so signatures and PKI can move to ML-DSA in planned stages rather than a big-bang revocation.
⚠️ Exam Trap: Hybrid PQ TLS protects data only while it moves. A file whose AES key is wrapped with RSA and then stored in S3 is still harvestable at rest; the key wrapping itself must move to ML-KEM.