2.2.1. Authentication Methods
💡 First Principle: Methods differ in what an attacker must defeat. A code sent by SMS can be intercepted or phished; a push approval can be fatigued; a passkey is bound cryptographically to the real site and can't be relayed to a fake one. That's why policy moves users up the ladder toward phishing-resistant methods.
Where it lives. Microsoft Entra admin center > Entra ID > Authentication methods > Policies, managed by at least the Authentication Policy Administrator. Each method can be enabled for all users or for groups, and groups can be excluded. A brand-new tenant has every method off in this policy. The policy can't be saved once it exceeds 20 KB, so target groups rather than long user lists.
Migration from the legacy policies. Until migration finishes, a user enabled for a method in any policy — legacy or new — can register and use it, so disabling a method in the Authentication methods policy alone doesn't block it. The Manage migration control has three states:
| State | What happens |
|---|---|
| Pre-migration | The Authentication methods policy is used for authentication only; legacy settings are still respected |
| Migration in Progress | The new policy is used for authentication and SSPR; legacy settings are still respected |
| Migration Complete | Only the Authentication methods policy is used; legacy settings are ignored |
An automated migration guide on the Policies page proposes a configuration from your legacy settings and sets the state to Migration Complete. FIDO2, Temporary Access Pass and certificate-based authentication exist only in the new policy.
The methods that matter for the exam:
| Method | Strength | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Passkeys (FIDO2) — device-bound (security keys, Microsoft Authenticator) or synced | Phishing-resistant | Available in every Entra edition, including Free. Users must have done MFA within the last 5 minutes to register one; guests can't register passkeys. Synced passkeys don't support attestation |
| Certificate-based authentication | Phishing-resistant | Configured only in the Authentication methods policy |
| Microsoft Authenticator (push or passwordless) | Strong | Number matching is on for all Authenticator push notifications; users can't opt out |
| Temporary Access Pass (TAP) | Time-limited | For onboarding and recovery; one TAP per user at a time |
| Software and hardware OATH tokens | Moderate | |
| SMS and voice | Weakest | SMS has "Use for sign-in" on by default |
Passkey profiles let you apply different passkey rules — enforced attestation, allowed passkey types, allowed or blocked key models by AAGUID — to different groups. Opting in moves your existing settings into a Default profile, and you can't opt out afterwards. You can have up to three profiles. Attestation is checked only at registration, while AAGUID restrictions apply at both registration and sign-in. To require passkeys for a set of users, you don't flip a switch in the methods policy — you use a Conditional Access authentication strength (the built-in phishing-resistant strength, or a custom one).
Temporary Access Pass defaults to a one-hour lifetime with an eight-hour maximum (configurable from 10 minutes to 30 days), eight characters, and multi-use unless you set one-time use. Authentication Administrators can issue TAPs to non-admin users, never to themselves; Privileged Authentication Administrators can issue them to admins too. Your tenant can't issue a TAP to an external guest — an external guest can use a TAP from their home tenant if cross-tenant access trusts that tenant's MFA.
System-preferred MFA prompts each user with the strongest method they've registered rather than the one they used last. It is a three-state setting at Authentication methods > Settings — Disabled, Enabled (second factor only) or Microsoft managed (the default, covering first and second factors). Its ranking runs from TAP and passkeys at the top, then certificate-based authentication, Authenticator notifications, external MFA, TOTP, telephony, QR code and finally password. Conditional Access and authentication-strength requirements still take priority over it.
⚠️ Exam Trap: "Require phishing-resistant MFA for administrators" is solved with a Conditional Access policy that uses an authentication strength — not by disabling other methods in the Authentication methods policy, which would also stop everyone else using them, and in an unfinished migration might not block them at all.
Reflection Question: A new employee's laptop arrives before they've registered any MFA method, and your Conditional Access policy requires MFA for every sign-in. Which method lets them get in to register a passkey, and what lifetime settings would you choose?